INTRODUCTION
Traditional command-and-control regulation by the state has been criticized for being ineffective, inflexible and neglecting the responsibilities of citizens and organizations. In food safety regulation, as elsewhere, alternative forms of regulation are being explored, such as self-regulation, co-regulation, m anage ment-based regulation and private systems of governance (Aalders & Wilthagen 1997; Braithwaite 1982; Coglianese & Lazer 2003; Furger 1997; Gunningham & Sinclair 1999; Hutter 2001: 9-10) In this paper I want to explore which actors are involved in decision-making in private and mixed forms of food regulation. This question is important for at least two reasons. First, private regulation is supposed to be better than tradi tional command and control regulation, that is, more effective at lower costs.
Some of the assumed advantages of private regulation are based on the sup position that private regulation is self-regulation, regulating your own actions.
Self-regulation is advantageous because requirements are based on everyd ay T.Havinga@jur.ru.nl. This paper is prepared for the Symposium on Private Governance in the G lobal Agro-Food System 23-25 April 2008, Münster Germany. work and inside knowledge; this will prevent practical obstacles in implementa tion and application. Moreover it is supposed that 'own' rules will be accepted more easily and will have a higher level of compliance. However, most docu mented instances of self-regulation are not 'pure' self-regulatory because they are under some kind of surveillance of government agencies, e.g. in the field of environmental policy and safety and health policy. Moreover there is often the implicit threat of imposed government regulation in case this 'associational' self-regulation would become derailed (De Vroom 1 990; Gunningham 1 995; Gunningham & Rees 1997; G rant 1987: 189 ff.; Havinga & Jettinghoff 1999; Streeck & Schmitter 1985: 19-20) . Traditionally, private regulations are thought to originate from industry (industry association). Private regulations may also originate from an external organisation such as a powerful trade partner or a non-governmental organisation (Havinga 2006 A second reason for exploring the involvement of actors is the issue of le gitimacy and accountability of the regulation. In particular, because some forms of regulation are not pure self-regulation, but regulation by private parties imposed on other actors, the question is how this type of regulation can be le gitimized.
Participation of regulated industry in decision-making in the regulatory a r rangement is essential and risky at the same time. From the perspective of e f fectiveness of the regulatory arrangement it is highly important that regulated industry has a say in the standards and their interpretation and application.
For constructing trust in a regulatory arrangement however it is important that regulated industry is not too powerful. A regulatory arrangement were regu lated industry monopolizes the decision-making process will be criticized for being in the interest of industry only, neglecting other interests. From the per spective of democratic legitimacy, next to the participation of all regulated industries, in particular the participation of other stakeholders such as consumer organisations or N G O s is vital.
ACTORS IN REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS
In analysing the involvement of different categories of actors in private regula tion, three distinctions have to be made: categories of actors, phases of regula tion and forms of participation.
Three broad categories of actors are involved in regulation: state actors, industry and third parties such as N G O s or civil society. However, for analyzing the involvement of actors in private systems of food regulation a more sophisti cated categorisation of private actors is needed. For effectiveness and for le gitimacy it is important to distinguish between private actors which are regu lated (regulatees), private actors which are part of the production chain but are not regulated themselves by the regulation at hand such as suppliers and retailers, private actors providing services to the regaled industry such as certi fication and auditing business, and private actors outside the production chain such as N G O s and consumers. For this purpose we take all state actors together as public actors such as national or European legislators, inspectorates, and departments.
In analysing the involvement of actors in decision-making in regulatory a r rangements it is not only important to distinguish between different categories of participants, but also between the phases of regulation. Bernstein and Cashore (2007) showed for non-state market driven governance systems that political legitimacy is constructed in a three-phase-process with different rela In answering these questions we will examine actor participation in some cases of private food governance initiated by retailers: British retail consortium and alternative retailers food safety standards, G lo b a lG a p , and the Global Food Safety Initiative. I rely heavily on information the private governance schemes themselves provide on their web sites.
British Retail Consortium Global standard for food safety
Fifteen or twenty years ago, food safety was not an important issue for most supermarket organizations in the Netherlands and probably elsewhere. At that time, Dutch supermarkets did not have food safety programs nor a food safety adviser or department. This changed dramatically since. In the 1 990-s some supermarket organizations generated their own comprehensive quality assur ance scheme including unexpected inspections at farms, gardens and plants For supermarkets it is much cheaper and easier to require suppliers to comply with a food safety standard than to maintain your own quality assurance sys tem. Some respondents commented that supermarkets first required their sup pliers to implement a food safety system, while not implementing similar meas ures in their own supermarket organisation. The Food Marketing Institute conducts programs in research, education, food safety, industrial relations and public affairs on behalf of its 1,500 mem bers (food retailers and wholesalers). Membership represents three-quarters of 6 Analyzing similarities and differences between 2 retail driven standards: BRC 
From Eurepgap to Global Gap
Another retailer initiative in food safety governance is EurepG ap. Small-scale farmers are often faced with more difficulties to fulfill the require ments. G lo b a lG a p has implemented three approaches to facilitate small farm ers: group certification, smallholder manual and extra feedback opportunities.
Global Food Safety Initiative
In 2000 a group of international retailers started the G lobal Food Safety Initi ative (GFSI) in order to agree on globally accepted food safety standards. By now, four food safety standards have been benchmarked to be in compliance with the G FSI Guidance Document.17 Three of these benchmarked standards are owned by retailer organizations (BRC, IFS, and SQF). The mission of G FSI is to strengthen consumer confidence in the food they buy in retail outlets. In short, 14 www.eurep.org/sites/q_and_a_general_questions (exact date unknown -probably autumn 2002). 15 After presenting this paper I found this to be wrong. Growers or primary producers are not represented in Global G a p as I suggest in the paper; supplier members include ex port and import firms and wholesale businesses. 16 www2.globalgap.org/members (19-2-2008 
CONCLUSIONS
The cases show great variety in the development of a private food regulation.
From regulation originated from one retailer it evolved to regulation of the united retailers, monitored by independent certification and inspection organi The cases show retailers setting up regulations for producers (not self regulation). This is an easy and cheap w a y to assure food safety, much cheaper than an own assurance system. Besides, the retailer is able to pass on responsibility in case something goes wrong. Being social responsible would be apparent from developing food safety and quality programs for retailers first or together with programs for suppliers. The food safety standards BRC, IFS and SQ F are forced upon producers of own-branded products (not on all sup pliers). This indicates that retailers embarked on this, not primarily because re tailers are social responsible, but because they needed to get hold of the qual ity and safety of own-brand products. This are not cases of retailers acting social responsible, but retailers passing the buck to producers. A cultural d iffer ence between the UK and Germ any/France was suggested. This paper does not provide information to conclude whether this is a difference in actions taken or only another presentation.
G lo b a lG a p is most open over its internal structure. Retailers as well as growers working with G lo b a lG a p certification can join the club, choose mem bers of the committees and participate in decision-making. G lo b a lG a p is probably the most democratic of the described private food regulations.
G lo b a lG a p is also the only scheme were some organizations of growers from developing countries participate and that includes animal w elfare and labour conditions.
EurepGap did very well, it expanded over the world, became a widely accepted standard required by many supermarkets and included other a g ra r ian products next to the original fruits and vegetables. However, not only Eurepgap did well. BRC standards also expanded. So becoming more democ ratic is not a prerequisite for growth.
A final word has to be said on private food safety standards as voluntary standards. One could argue that compliance with a private standard is volun tary. A food producer is not legally obliged to comply with a private standard.
However, market forces do force compliance. In many countries such as UK, The
Netherlands, Germany, France all major retailers require certification of sup pliers. A food producer or grower that lacks certification will be economically sanctioned. M ajor parties will not buy his products anymore. Purchasing power of supermarkets makes retail food safety standards obligatory for all who want to stay in the market. For retailers it is most important to assure against all possible risks leaving the costs for the regulated suppliers. This makes p a r ticipation of manufacturers and growers in decision making in food safety standards particularly important to safeguard against ever rising requirements.
Food safety regulation shows expanding expectations. Both private and public food regulations extend their scope and aims, not only UK but Europe or world, not only safe food but also sustainable, animal welfare.
